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BOOK REVIEWS
By C. Bellamy and G.D.
Child. New York: Matthew Bender, 1973. Pp. xxvi, 361. $22.00.
COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION.

Except for scholarly discussions and research generated at a
handful of centers for European studies throughout the United
Kingdom, there has been a paucity of British literature on the
functional aspects of European Community law.' In particular
there has been a scarcity of literature about antitrust matters.
With the accession of the United Kingdom to the Community in
1973, however, the amount of published material that is directed
toward the British practitioner, businessman, and student and
that explains the impact and nuances of Common Market antitrust law as well as other commercial law has burgeoned. Publication of Common Market Law of Competition comes as part of this
sudden and belated swell of available material.
The primary purpose of the book in the authors' words is "to
explain [to the British reader] the general principles of the Community antitrust rules from a practical point of view and to illustrate those general principles by reference to the available decisions." The book's treatment of the subject matter is sufficiently
broad, however, to serve as a general guide for the American businessman, attorney, or student interested in Common Market antitrust laws. The Common Market Law of Competition places emphasis on a practical discussion of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome, the key articles of the Treaty dealing with competition
or antitrust matters. To date, article 85 has been construed as
applying exclusively to restrict trade practices, while article 86 has
been used to attack abuses of a "dominant position," but the two
1. As used in this article, the term "Common Market" will be used interchangeably with "European Community," the "Community," and "EEC." Nine
states presently comprise the Common Market: the six original membersBelgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands-and
three new acceding members-Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The

primary governing institutions of the Common Market set up under the Treaty
of Rome, which established the Common Market in 1958, are: (a) the European
Assembly, (b) the Council of Ministers, (c) the European Commission, and (d)
the European Court of Justice.
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articles should not be read as being mutually exclusive.' The enforcement and implementation of the Common Market rules of
competition are essentially administrative functions of the European Commission; 3 however, the ultimate interpreter of the
Treaty's antitrust provisions is the European Court of Justice.4
The Court of Justice has had a significant influence on the evolution of Common Market antitrust law,5 and because of such influence, a consideration of Common Market Law of Competition by
Bellamy and Child is particularly germane to the present edition
of the Journal.
Almost every aspect of Common Market antitrust law is treated
to some extent in this useful work, but certain deficiencies are
notable. The book gives little insight into exactly how Common
Market law will interrelate with existing British practice. Such
insight certainly would have made the book more substantial since
2. Paragraph 1 of article 85 prohibits "all agreements between enterprises, all
decisions by associations of enterprises and concerted practices which are apt to
affect trade between the Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market." This paragraph also contains certain illustrative, but not exhaustive, examples of particular restrictive trade activities that would be incompatible with the
establishment of the Common Market if the general restrictions of paragraph 1
are met. Under paragraph 2, any agreement, decision or concerted practice violative of paragraph 1 shall be "null and void;" that is, without any prior decision
of the European Commission or the Court of Justice, such acts will be deemed
null and void ab initio. Paragraph 3 provides conditions under which prohibited
acts may be granted specific exemptions (at the discretion of the Commission)
from article 85. Further, article 86 specifically prohibits "[any abusive exploitation by one or more enterprises of a dominant position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it.

. .

."

Activities that violate article 86 are

absolutely null and void and, unlike article 85 violations, are not subject to
exemption.
3. See generally Graupner, Commission Decision-Making on Competition
Questions, 10 Comm. MKT. L. REV. 291 (1973).
4. See Treaty of Rome, art. 167.
5. For landmark decisions see Brasserie de Haecht Case (No. 2), 2 CCH
COMM.MKT. REP. 8170, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 287 (1973) (effect of nullity under
article 85(2)); ContinentalCan Case, 2 CCH Coimi. MKT. REP. 8209, 12 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973) (applicability of article 86 to abuse of a dominant position);
Deutsche Grammophon Case, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT.REP. 8106, 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.Q. 631 (1971) (abuse-of industrial property rights); ICI Case, 2 CCH Comm.
8161, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972) (such matters as nature of
MKT. REP.
"concerted practices," parent-subsidiary relationships, and extraterritorial effects of EEC antitrust laws); Wilhem Case, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 8056, 8
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100 (1969) (relationship of Community laws to national antitrust systems); Parke,Davis Case, 2 CoMm. MKT. REP. 8054, 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
47 (1968) (patents).
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the Community law of competition has now become the law of the
land in the United Kingdom, and since significant problems, both
substantive and procedural, confront the British practitioner in his
attempts to adapt his past approach and techniques to the system
as it is modified by Community law.' Further, Common Market
Law of Competition makes only scant reference to the economic
and political underpinnings of Community antitrust law. This is
unfortunate since the convergence of law, politics, and economics
forms the heart of any antitrust system; indeed, the fundamental
differences between previous British regulation of competition and
concentration and regulation by the Community and the United
States are rooted primarily in their varying economic and political
philosophies. 7 As with all literature on Community law, the movement of time and the rapidly evolving nature of the law unavoidably result in a built-in obsolescence. 8
The authors, while admittedly not purporting to provide a scholarly and critical analysis of Common Market competition law,
make little or no reference to the voluminous opinions in foreign
(including American) works on the subject. Rather, the book contains only citations to decisions of the Court of Justice and the
various municipal courts of the Member States, decisions and notices of the European Commission, and regulations of the Council
of Ministers The treatment of original sources, however, is most
useful in helping the student of Community law develop an
absolutely essential understanding of the primary legal sources
that deal with the Common Market law of competition."0 Although
Common Market Law of Competition lacks a summary of biblio6. On certain general legal considerations surrounding British accession see
generally LEGAL PROBLEMS OF AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY (M. Bathurst,
et. al. eds. 1972).

7. See generally D. SwANN & LEES, ANTITRUST PoLcY iN EUROPE (1973).
8. For example, since the publication of Common Market Law of Competition
in 1973, the Court of Justice has decided the Continental Can Case and is in the
process of deciding Sterling Drug. In addition, the European Commission has
handed the Council of Ministers a Draft Regulation on the Control of Concentrations.
9. The primary positive source of Common Market law generally is the Treaty
of Rome, which, despite the complexity of some 248 articles covering a variety of
economic and noneconomic matters, is a trait6 cadre. Secondary sources include

the various regulations, directives, and decisions of the Council of Ministers and
the European Commission, the decisions of the European Court of Justice, the

resolutions of the European Assembly, and the general principles of law among
the Member States.
10.

See generally PERRY & HARDY, EEC LAW (1973).
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graphical materials, the indices do contain an exhaustive list of
legislative and judicial source materials with adequate cross references to the discussions in the book and appropriate references to
the Bulletin of the European Communities, Common Market Law
Reports, Common Market Law Review, the Official Gazette of the
European Communities, the Official Reports of the European
Court, and to the CCH Common Market Reporter (which proves
to be a most convenient source for the American reader).
Despite its apparent drawbacks, Common Market Law of
Competition is a well conceived and organized primer on Common
Market antitrust law. After a brief introduction into the general
nature of the Community law and its basic antitrust structure, the
authors logically and coherently analyze articles 85 and 86. As with
the basic American antitrust provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, articles 85 and 86 are skeletal provisions, and, therefore,
give rise to very difficult problems in their application." Chapters
2 and 7 adequately assess, in light of then existing Community
statutory, administrative and case law, such knotty legal concepts
as "undertakings," "concerted practices," "effects on trade between member states," "dominant position," (and abuse thereof)
and "extraterritorial effect." A summary treatment of the common
types of agreements that might fall within the ambit of article
85(1) is contained in chapter 3. Chapters 8 through 11 treat more
extensively such matters as exclusive distributorships, licensing,
specialization, and research and development agreements. The
latter area will prove to be particularly interesting to the American
businessman and attorney because of the amount of shared knowledge between American and Common Market businesses. Chapter
4 contains a brief but excellent consideration of the impact of
article 85(2) on the concept of nullity, including a well-balanced
discussion of the Brasseriede Haecht (No. 2) case, decided by the
Court of Justice in February 1973, which made suspect the prior
reliance on the concept of "provisional validity." 2 The nature and
11. See generally W. ALEXANDER, THE EEC RULES OF COMPETmoN (1973); C.
BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION (1973); J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE E.E.C.; A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1973); A.
DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1968);

EEC COMMISSION, PRACTICAL GUIDE OF THE COMMISSION, ARTICLES 85 & 86 OF THE
EEC TREATY AND RELEVANT REGULATIONS; A MANUAL FOR FIRMS (Megret ed. 1962),
4 LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUT ECONOMIQUE EUROP9ENNE (1972).
12. For further discussion see Vogelaar & Guy, The Second Brasserie de
Haecht Case: A Delphic Oracle, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 648 (1973); and Wertheimer, The Haecht II Judgment and Its Repercussions, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 386
(1973).
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distinction between negative clearance for purposes of article 85(1)
and notification procedure for purposes of article 85(3) are treated
in chapter 5.13 Article 85(3), which is often described as the Community's "rule of reason," is discussed in chapter 6.14 The concluding chapter deals with the powers, of the Commission within the
overall framework of the Common Market antitrust regulations.
The appendices contain relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome
that deal with antitrust matters, relevant regulations of the Council of Ministers, and announcements and notices of the European
Commission.
As most American businessmen and attorneys doing business in
Europe are aware, the Common Market laws of competition constitute the basic and overriding antitrust regulations in Western Europe today. 5 While not precluding the continuing existence of national antitrust laws, the Common Market antitrust laws and regulations are directly applicable within the Member States and give
rise to rights and obligations therein. Moreover, in instances of
conflict between Common Market laws and national laws, the
municipal courts resolve the conflict under the principle of supremacy of Community law." Common Market Law of
Competition, despite its British pedigree, should be a helpful starting point for the American businessman and attorney into the
conceptual and practical labyrinth of Common Market antitrust
laws and regulations.
Joseph Jude Norton*
13. Simply, negative clearance is a qualified statement of the European Commission that in its view and on the facts given article 85(1) is not applicable to
the questioned agreement, decision or practice. Notification of the Commission
is the procedural prerequisite for an exemption under article 85(3) and presupposes a contravention of article 85(1).
14. See R. JoLIEr, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTiTRUST LAW, 115-16 (1967). But
cf. Zapheriou, Rule of Reason and Double Jeopardy in EuropeanAntitrust Law,

6

TEXAS INT'L L.F.

1, 6 (1970).

15. Such American controlled enterprises as Continental Can, Parke Davis,
Kodak, Scott Paper, Sperry Rand, Smith Corona, Davison Rubber, Commercial
Solvents, Pittsburgh Coming, Burroughs and Sterling Drug have been the subject
of Common Market antitrust proceedings. For an interesting discussion of
whether Common Market antitrust laws are discriminatory toward non-EEC
firms see Dietz, Enforcement of Anti-trust Laws in the EEC, 6 INT'L LAw. 742
(1972). 16. See Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 2 CCH Co~i~. MKT. REP. 8056,
8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100 (1969).
* Associate, Locke, Purnell, Boren, Laney & Neely (A Professional Corporation), Dallas; Lecturer in Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
B.A., 1966, Providence College; LL.B., 1969, University of Edinburgh; LL.M.,
1970, University of Texas; LL.M., 1972, S.J.D., 1974, University of Michigan.

Edited by
Wolfgang G. Friedmann. New York: Columbia University Press,
1974, Pp. xi, 410.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN MIXED ECONOMIES.

Professor Wolfgang Friedman was, without doubt, a leader in
the world community of legal scholars. He was a prolific author on
a vast range of topics, with special emphasis on legal philosophy
and international law. He left a profound impact on those who
were associated with him personally, at Columbia Law School and
far beyond. And he provided stimulation and opportunities for
scholars from many countries to participate in a series of international legal studies projects at Columbia from 1955 until his death
in 1972.1

Public and Private Enterprisesin Mixed Economies is the last
of the collaborative books resulting from these projects. It includes
chapters contributed by other authorsi on France (Roland Drago),
Italy (Giuseppino Treves), Nigeria (T. 0. Elias), Turkey (Tugrul
Ansay), the United Kingdom (Terence C. Daintith), and'the
United States (Arthur Selwyn Miller and Ralph C. Ferrara), followed by Friedmann's chapter setting forth his comparative observations. Each chapter includes a relatively brief discussion of the
structure and types of public enterprise. More detail of this nature
appears in Government Enterprise,2 an earlier volume resulting
from the Columbia program on international legal studies, in similar format, edited by Friedmann together with J. F. Garner. The
book under review carries the analysis further, by inquiring into
the relationship between public and private enterprise in "mixed"
economies, that is, systems which are neither totally dominated by
state enterprise, nor operating under a totally unregulated system
of competitive private enterprise.
Friedmann's conclusions focus on the need, which he regards as
crucial, for the legal system to guarantee equality and fairness of
competition, whenever public and private enterprises compete.
Thus he asserts, as a matter of principle, that public enterprises
competing directly or indirectly with private enterprises should not
1. Professor Friedmann was killed by robbers on the streets of New York City
on September 20, 1972. This tragedy is noted in an obituary by Professor A. A.
Faturos, at the beginning of the volume under review, which was published in
1974.
2. GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (W. Friedmann & J. Gar-

ner eds. 1970). The book includes contributed chapters on the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Germany, Sweden, the United States, Canada, Australia, Israel,
and East Africa, followed by Friedmann's comparative analysis.
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be given tax exemptions, immunity from suit, or other advantages
3
not enjoyed by their private competitors.
The conclusion is not derived from a consensus of the jurisdictions studied in the book. Turkey alone clearly recognizes and
purportedly applies the principle. According to Professor Ansay's
chapter, the Turkish constitution recognizes that country's commitment to maintaining a mixed economy, and the government's
Second Five Year Plan proposes various means of achieving this
commitment, including the assurance of equality and fairness of
competition between public and private enterprises.4 At the opposite extreme, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
constitution does not guarantee the protection of private enterprises, either from competition by public enterprises, or from the
grant of tax exemptions or other preferences to the public competitor.5 The traditional practice has indeed been to confer tax exemption and other privileges upon public enterprise. This tradition developed at a time when public enterprises played a relatively small role in the overall economy, but has continued during the
significant expansion of that role in recent decades. Between the
Turkish and United States positions, Nigeria accepts the principle
of equality between public and private enterprises, but only in
context of a declared national policy of steadily increasing the
extent of public ownership of major industries.' France 7 and Italy8
recognize freedom of commerce and equality before the law, ostensibly supporting Friedmann's principle, but the contributing au3. PUB IC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN MIXED ECONOMIES 383, 390 (W. Friedmann ed. 1974) (hereinafter cited as MIXED ECONOMIES).
4. Ansay, Turkey, in MIXED ECONOMIES, at 137; Friedmann, id., at 361, 385.
5. Miller and Ferrara, United States, in MIXED ECONOMIES, at 291; Friedmann, Id., at 389. In support of the basic propositions in the accompanying text,
as applied to federal government enterprises, the authors cite McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (181); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936);
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) and Tennessee Electric Power
Co. v. TVA, 302 U.S. 122 (1938). The present reviewer notes that similar principles govern the federal constitutional status of state and local government enterprises. See, e.g., Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934)
(recently reaffirmed as "good law" in City of Pittsburghv. Alco Parking Corp.,
417 U.S. 369 (1974)). However, state constitutional law presents a less uniform
approach. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St.
97, 91 N.E.2d 480 (1950); 63 AM. JuR. 2d PublicFunds § 75; 56 AM. Jun. 2d Municipal Corporations § 210.
6. Elias, Nigeria, in MIXED ECONOMIES, at 87.
7. Drago, France, in MIXED ECONOMIES, at 3; Friedmann, id., at 387.
8. Treves, Italy, in MIXED ECONOMIES, at 43; Friedmann, id., at 384-85.
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thors demonstrate how the practice in both countries has repeatedly favored public enterprises despite the controls attempted by
the administrative courts. The United Kingdom partially recognizes the principle, generally conferring equal treatment by means
of legislative and administrative action.' However British courts
have not developed effective remedies in the event of departures
from this practice.
Neither the contributed chapters nor Friedmann's conclusions
provide convincing support for Friedmann's choice of the Turkish
model, which recognizes equality and fairness of competition, over
the American model, which does not. Friedmann justifies his
choice by asserting, with minimal discussion, that it derives from
the "express or implied principles of a mixed economy."'" His previous writings, however, provide further insight into the genesis of
Friedmann's conclusions. In Legal Theory," he discusses the nature of the mixed economy as a characteristic feature of social
democracies distinct from Marxist legal systems. In a mixed economy, "it will probably have to be regarded as part and parcel of a
social democratic legal ideology that public and private enterprise
should be treated as equals. This may mean the creation of administrative and judicial organs to safeguard the application of equal
standards."' 2 Additional discussion along similar lines is found in
the Tagore Lectures, published as The State and the Rule of Law
in a Mixed Economy.'

3

The book under reveiw would have been improved by a more
elaborate evaluation of the Turkish and American models, together with the author's explanation for his adoption of the Turkish approach as a matter of principle. The discussion could usefully have included not only the conceptual arguments, but also
some exploration of the practical consequences of choosing one
model rather than the other. In addition, valuable insights could
have been provided into the factors which tend to encourage private investment in mixed economies, and into the techniques of
negotiating on behalf of the various parties. The impact of non9. Daintith, The United Kingdom, in MIXED ECONOMIES, at 195; Friedmann,
id., at 386-88.
10. Friedmann, in MIXED ECONOMIES, at 389.
11. W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 383-86 (5th ed. 1967).
12. Id., at 386. Friedmann's view on this matter can be traced back to W.
Friedmann, Law and Social Change in ContemporaryBritain301, 308-10 (1951),
a volume which was the precedessor of Legal Theory.
13.

(1971).

W. FRIEDMANN, THE STATE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN A MIXED ECONOMY
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governmental groups, such as consumer associations and environmental defenders, could also have been usefully discussed. Finally,
some comparisons with socialist economies, and some discussion
of trading relationships between socialist and non-socialist systems
would have added to the value of the work.
If circumstances had permitted, the publisher's editorial staff
could-and indeed should-have invited Friedmann to expand
and explain his conclusions. This approach was unfortunately precluded by his death within a few days after completion of the
manuscript."
As published the book serves two distinct purposes. First, it
provides a medium through which the contributing authors present their descriptions of the several jurisdictions studied. Secondly, it provides an insight, albeit incomplete, into Friedmann's
view of mixed economies, based not so much upon the contributed
chapters in this volume, as upon Friedmann's own prior publications. As indicated previously, the theoretical framework flows
from Legal Theory and the Tagore Lectures. The practical understanding of the problem, seldom expressed in the volume under
review, was previously mastered by Friedmann in two sets of case
studies, Joint InternationalBusiness Ventures (with George
Kalmanoff) 1 and Joint InternationalBusiness Ventures in Developing Countries (with Jean-Pierre Beguin). 1" The dynamics of
negotiating private investment in mixed economies were emphasized in some of Friedmann's law review articles.17 The status of
public enterprise in socialist systems was explored' comparatively
in Friedmann's study of governmental enterprises in the International Encyclopedia of ComparativeLaw."8
When considered as an installment in the unfolding of Fried14. The author's preface to Mixed Economies is dated September 5, 1972. He
died just fifteen days later. See note 1 supra. The book, published in 1974, gives
no indication that anybody other than Friedmann undertook any editing.

15. W.

FRIEDMANN

& G.

KAL?ANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES

(1961).
16. W.

FRIEDMANN & J. P. BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971).

17. See, e.g., Friedmann, Foreword, Foreign Investment Planning and Economic Development, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 251 (1963); Friedmann, The Role of Law
and the Function of the Lawyer in the Developing Countries, 17 VAND. L. REV.
181 (1963); Friedmann, Foreword, Law and Economic Development: Symposium,
10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 195 (1971).
18. Friedmann, Governmental (Public) Enterprises,in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (K. Zweigert ed. 1969). In this work, Freidmann
also presents a useful comparative bibliography.
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mann's views, based on his earlier writings, the conclusion to the
book under review is to be cherished. When considered, on the
other hand, solely in context of the contributed chapters of the
same volume, the conclusion does not emerge as Friedmann at his
most forceful or persuasive. To find the best of Friedmann, we need
only sample his prolific contributions to the law reviews, whether
on the United States involvement in the Vietnam conflict, 9 the
judgment of the International Court in the South West Africa
cases,"0 the risks to humanity arising from genetic engineering,2 ' or
19. 'Friedmann severely criticized certain United States government lawyers
who invoked principles of international law to justify "what is patently, by standards of international law, an illegal action. But by using the language of legal
rather than political justification, the argument comes unintentionally close to
the attempts made by Nazi and Communist lawyers to justify the interventionist
and aggressive actions of their respective governments in terms of a legal order
of the future." Friedmann, United States Policy and the Crisis of International
Law, 59 Am.J. INT'L L. 857, 869 (1965). See also Friedmann, Law and Politics in
the Vietnamese War: A Comment, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 776 (1967); Friedmann,
Intervention, Civil War, and the Role of InternationalLaw, 59 PRoc. Am. Soc.
INT'L L. 67 (1965).
20. Friedmann deeply regretted the failure of the International Court to deal
effectively with the South West Africa controversy. "It is to be feared that the
Judgment of the International Court in the South West Africa case has dealt a
devastating blow to the hope that the International Court might be able to deal
with explosive and delicate international issues. The valuable and penetrating
discussion of these matters in some of the dissenting judgments cannot mitigate
the fact that the Court, for whatever reasons, failed to meet the challenge. This
doubt that the Court will function as a judicial arbiter in some of the major
international issues of our time is likely to be a far graver consequence of the
Court's verdict than the political disappointment of some of the states, and of
many groups and individuals, that the Court failed to condemn the apartheid
policies of South Africa." Friedmann, JurisprudentialImplications of the South
West Africa Cases, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 16 (1967).
21. "[M]ankind has not even begun to understand-let alone translate into
terms of social and legal values-the consequences of interference with the qualitative composition of man . .

.

.the manipulation and indeed the manufacture

of human beings according to certain predetermined standards would sweep away
the foundations of all human history. The task of finding the proper borderline
between social planning-and corresponding legal controls-and the acceptance
of an order of nature that man cannot alter, except at the price of self-destruction,
will no doubt be the most important single task of the next few decades. The
answer is far from certain. What we cannot afford is to let scientific developments
proceed any further without close coordination with their social and legal consequences." Friedmann, Interference with Human Life: Some Jurisprudential
Reflections, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1058, 1076-77 (1970).
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the relationship between law and mankind's sense of justice.2
L. Harold Levinson*

22. Friedmann revealed many of his own values in his review of Professor
Julius Stone's trilogy, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings; Human Law and
Human Justice; and Social Dimensions of Law and Justice. "Professor Stone's
final message is relatively simple: that conceptual analysis is insufficient, that
the quest for justice is necessary, unending, and never conclusive, except for a
given society at a given time, and that the study of concrete social phenomena
and developments is always a necessary complement to the analysis of law and
the theories of justice. Behind the message is the faith of a modem liberal, who
believes in human freedom and social responsibility, and who derives from a
lifetime's study of jurisprudence, past and present, the faith that men will not
ultimately sink back into barbarism. Mankind's survival depends on his faith's
being proved right." Friedmann, Book Review, 67 CoLUmi. L. REv. 1344, 1348-49
(1967).
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.B.A., 1957, LL.B., 1962, University of Miami; LL.M., 1964, New York University; J.S.D., 1974, Columbia University.

